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Abstract 
International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) could be valuable in adding legitimacy to 
global governance through countering the democratic deficit of supranational governance 
(Kraft-Kasach 2008: 553). The scope and capabilities of these organizations have increased 
but substantive studies that compare their role and scope are still lacking (Kissling 2014: 9).  
Although Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) find a wide range of strength levels of International 
Parliamentary Organs the literature does not provide adequate explanations to explain this 
variation. This thesis aims to contribute to the overview of the strength of International 
Parliamentary Organs (IPOs) and explanatory factors by looking at the influence of wealth of 
member states through statistical analysis. Research to wealth in relation to parliamentary 
strength has been conducted on the national parliamentary level but not yet on the level of 
international parliament. The statistical analysis reaffirms the strength findings by Cofelice & 
Stavridus and show that the difference in strength levels of IPOs cannot be attributed to the 
wealth of the member states. An additional small N- case study analysis finds that the 
intention of the parliamentary body and the mission of the main body provide a good 
explanation for the variance in strength levels.  
 
In the last 70 years the number of International organizations and institutions increased, which 
shaped a global governance structure that changed the manner in which states have 
approached matters of shared interest. The rise of international organizations also included the 
development of International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs). This group of institutions 
mushroomed after the Second World War, with the most notable change in numbers visible 
post 1989/1991 (Cofelice & Stavridus 2014: 148). Currently there exist between 40 and 100 
IPIs in the world, depending on the conceptualisation used (Cofelice & Stavridus 2014:145).  
Global governance reduces legitimacy on the input side of politics because decisions 
are taken further away from the citizens, making it more difficult to hold policy-makers 
accountable and to participate in the political process (Kraft-Kasach 2008: 534). This reduced 
democratic legitimacy, which is often being described as the ‘democratic deficit’ of 
international governance, has led to criticism of the international governance system. An IPI 
may be needed in situations of supranational decision-making where the everyday lives of 
citizens are directly affected, to reduce this democratic deficit (Kraft Kasach 2008: 553). IPIs 
provide a structure for oversight of the executive based diplomacy and can furthermore create 
a middle ground for co-corporation between states through fostering lasting transnational 
relationships (Cutler 2001: 202). IPIs can therefore complement supranational governance. 
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These important functions and the increasing prominence of IPIs on the world stage make it 
valuable to analyse the role and place of these institutions  in International Relations. 
   Considering this value, one would be tempted to believe that this is an area that has 
been subject of frequent scholarly attention. However, this is not the case. There is very 
limited interest in researching the role of IPIs (Cofelice & Stavridus 2014: 145). The 
academic literature is marginal, especially in providing empirical evidence, useable concepts 
and theories (Rocabert, Schimmelfennig & Winzel 2014: 2). The literature is mostly 
concerned with efforts to group different IPIs into distinguished categories using definitions 
and typologies and/or discussing the question of legitimacy of these types of organisation  
(Rocabert, Schimmelfennig & Winzel 2014: 3-4). Much beyond this point is therefore 
unknown including the factors that explain why certain IPOs possess more or less powers 
than others.  
Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) do provide a first glimpse into the diversity of powers of 
various IPIs.  The 23 mapped IPIs show a large difference of parliamentary powers, with only 
consultative powers being common to all IPIs. The findings show that the strength of these 
international parliaments is generally low but the the parliamentary functions such as 
budgetary functions, appointment functions, oversight and legislative functions all vary 
substantially in degree of possession by the different IPIs. The large difference of 
parliamentary powers between IPIs raises the question of what the factors are to which this 
difference can be attributed. Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) do not explain the factors that could 
account for a different position on the strength scale. In order to fully understand the IPI as a 
global political entity these factors need to be researched.  
  As an independent variable wealth shall be studied. Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) show 
that many blocs of countries that are not considered to be wealthy have set up IPIs. This gives 
rise to the question whether the difference of strength values could perhaps be attributed to 
relatively new IPIs consisting of groups of relatively poor states. While perhaps being an 
explanatory factor and predictor of the strength of an IPO studying this relation could also test 
whether worldwide economic differences affect political representation on an international 
scale and is therefore of importance.  
The significance of researching the strength of international parliamentary institutions 
and the spread of IPOs over regions that are less wealthy has led me to develop the research 
question: To what extent can the wealth of participating member states to an IPO’ explain its 
strength?’ 
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This research shall investigate this matter using a comparative semi-experimental design with 
a mixed methods approach encompassing statistical research and case studies. Because of the 
focus of institutional strength this research can be seen as following recent movements in 
comparative political science of researching institutional strength over institutional design 
(Levitsky & Murillo 2009: 115). The project is part of a broader research project to the 
strength of an IPO conducted by me and my fellow students Sietse Paperborg, Armin 
Ademovic and Eef Van Der Werk. Together our efforts are directed towards finding the 
factors that determine the success of an IPO.  
 
Theory 
This segment sets out the theory that is of importance regarding this research to the influence 
of wealth on IPO strength. It starts with defining the core concepts IPO, IPO power and 
democracy which are crucial to the understanding and conducting of this research. It 
continues with an argument about the democratic nature of IPOs after which the body of 
academic literature that is relevant to this particular research shall be discussed . 
Cutler (2001) offers a threefold conceptualisation of international parliamentary 
institutions, which shall be used as the starting point in defining the institutions of interest to 
this study. In this conceptualisation an IPI is regarded as an parliamentary institution, whether 
consultative or legislative, comprising of at least three member states (1). It is an institution 
with parliamentarians that are selected by the national legislatures or elected directly by the 
electorate of the member countries (2). Furthermore, it is a forum of multilateral discussions 
and deliberations on a regular basis, which is established, either as an independent 
organization or attached to an international institution (3).  In this definition an IPI can be 
considered as an elected parliamentary institution comprising of at least three states meeting 
on a regular basis.  
Šabič (2008: 258) offers a distinction between types of IPIs based on a difference of 
affiliation. Šabič splits IPIs in International Parliamentary Organs (IPOs) and International 
Parliamentary Associations (IPAs). IPOs are part of an governmental organization e.g. the 
European Parliament as part of the European Union and IPAs are a structure on their own 
behalf e.g. The Inter-Parliamentary Union. This research is interested in IPOs as IPIs since 
this concept includes the parliamentary dimension of supranational global governance. 
Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) have conducted an institutional mapping exercise using Šabič’ 
typology to identify the amount of IPOs and IPIs. In this paper the researchers classify 23 
parliamentary bodies as IPOs.   A reexamination of this list reveals that there are currently 22 
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IPOs. The ‘Interparliamentary Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community does not exist 
anymore.  
  Strength in the way it is used in this thesis refers to power. A strong institution has a 
large set of powers. In this thesis the conceptualization schema provided by Cofelice & 
Stavridus (2014) shall be adopted. In this conceptualization the power of a IPO is split in a 
couple of components or sub-powers. Those are the Consultative, oversight, appointment, 
budgetary and legislative functions of those organizations. Consultative refers to the degree in 
which IPOs can deliver opinions to the main body and whether this is required by mandate of 
the main body. Oversight refers to the level of involvement of the IPO in overlooking the 
activities of other bodies of the main intergovernmental organization.   The Appointment 
function makes reference to the extent of the right of the IPO to be consulted in the 
appointment or election of members for other institutions of the main intergovernmental 
organisation. The budgetary function concerns the influence of the IPO in approving budget 
proposals. The legislative function shows the level of legislative involvement of the IPO. The 
degree of sub-powers an IPO possesses determines its strength value.  
Before proceeding with a conceptualisation of democracy it is important to 
acknowledge the defining characteristic of the IPO, which is the parliamentary aspect of 
conducting international affairs.  The parliamentary dimension of politics is and has been the 
traditional method to provide modern democracies with democratic legitimation (Kraft-
Kasack 2008: 535). With parliaments as the essential source of legitimation of democracies 
on the national level, it does make sense that in a globalized world with an increasingly 
complex and large supranational global governance system a source of democratic 
legitimation exists as well.  Authors such as Cutler (2001) and Kraft-Kasich (2008) have set 
out the rise of IPIs as a process of democratization in global governance, which raises the 
question whether or not IPIs and specifically IPOs can be viewed as a form of democracy.  
Democracy can be defined as an ‘institutional arrangement in which all adult 
individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections, for their chief 
executive and national legislature (Lipset & Lakin 2004: 19). Looking at this rather 
minimalist definition one can see that IPOs cannot be viewed as a part of a democracy 
because of the inherent focus on the national legislature in this definition. However, IPOs can 
fulfill democratic criteria and can so constitute a more or less democratic factor in 
supranational transnational politics. Kraft-Kasach (2008: 537) describes 9 criteria of 
democratic legitimation for parliamentary institutions: participation (1), information (2), 
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attributability of decisions (3), communication (4), decision-making (5), election (6), control 
(7), the revisability of policies (8) and the ability to further the common good (9).  
Most indicators of those criteria would differ across different IPOs but Kraft-Kasach 
notes that IPOs, or what he calls ‘Trans-Parliamentary Assemblies’, can add democratic 
legitimation because these institutions can fulfill numerous of those criteria. Kraft-Kasach 
states that  IPOs can provide a more direct representation in which opposition is included 
which contributes to the democratic ideal that those that are affected by the making of a 
policy should be included in the decision-making process (Kraft-Kasach 2008: 537). 
Furthermore, IPOs could also improve to quality and quantity of information available by 
members of parliament to function better and help in the areas of attributing decisions due to 
sharing information about cooperation.  
Šabič (2008: 255) also notes that IPIs can contribute to a more transparent and 
democratic global governance because the members of these bodies largely consist of directly 
or indirectly ‘democratically’ elected parliamentarians which can be very critical regarding 
governments, influence inter-governmental decision-making and address issues of national 
concern. This ability stems from the purpose of the creation of those institutions. An 
increasing amount of international organizations have set up those assemblies to overcome the 
so-called democratic deficit in global decision as a result of globalization and the erosion of 
power from national governments (Finizio, Levi, Vallinoto 2011:4).  
The rise of IPIs  is an example of how democracy can succeed outside of the state 
(Finizio, Levi, Vallinoto 2011: 4). Even though the exact level of democracy can differ 
between various IPOs due to different scores on the indicators it is thus safe to say based on 
the above mentioned criteria and reasons for founding that IPOs in general do possess a 
democratic quality. This can be important regarding the theories of wealth and democracy. If 
IPOs possess a democratic quality it might be possible to partly revisit the theories of wealth 
and democracy regarding the nation state for those international institutions. In this globalized 
age it is important to build theories that explain the working of international institutions. State 
centric theories could provide a reference or start point to look deeper into the workings of 
international institutions. 
In the past three decades democracy has spread faster and more thoroughly throughout 
the world than ever before in history (Lipset & Lakin 2004: 3).  It has changed the way in 
which politics has been organized and has therefore been studied extensively. The academic 
attention to the relationship between wealth and democracy started with the work of Seymour 
Martin Lipset (1959) who famously argued that ‘the more well-do a nation, the greater the 
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chances that it will sustain democracy’ (p. 31). In this work Lipset noted that his indices of 
wealth; per capita income, thousands of persons per doctor, person per motor vehicle, 
telephones per 1000 persons, radios per 1000 persons and newspaper copies per 1000 persons 
all show a correlation between high scores on the economic development indices and high 
levels of democracy. Lipset argued that not just wealth, but economic development in general 
promotes democracy by strengthening the middle classes, expanding media access and 
schooling, facilitating intermediary organizations, reducing the extremes of poverty and 
promoting tolerance and legitimacy (Norris 2007: 80). A high level of wealth and 
development would thus strengthen the level of democracy and contribute to strong 
democratic institutions. 
While the in initial empirical work of Lipset may be dated with changes in inequality 
and wealth over the last 50 years, the claim that wealth sustains democracy has been 
continuously studied. Lipset laid the foundation for an empirical examination of the 
relationship between wealth and democracy, of the ‘Lipset-theorem’ has become one of the 
most widely recognized generalizations in the social sciences (Norris 2007: 81). In more 
recent extensive works to the causes of democracy and the role of wealth, Prezworski et al.  
(2000) have argued that there is a level of wealth, roughly 6000 dollar per capita or more, at 
which democracies can be expected to prevail.  This research gives more body to the thought 
that a high level of wealth brings about a high level of freedom in the form of democracy.    
Looking at the worldwide spectrum, even one that is not at home in the literature can 
make observations that endorse the so-called ‘Lipset Theorem’. One can note that the wealthy 
western European states are or at least appear to be full democracies and that many African 
states tend to be poor or at least poorer and experience lower levels of democracy. While this 
does not say much from an academic theoretical point of view, it is interesting that most 
people would find this theory to be close to their experience of the world. However, research 
shows that this is not always the case. A glance at the indicators reveals important outliers to 
this theory (Norris 2007). There are wealthy states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Singapore, which do not entail a high level of democracy and could be called autocracies and 
there are states which are democracies to a certain extent such as Benin, Costa Rica, Ghana, 
Turkey, Hungary and India but do not have high levels of wealth. These examples show, that 
even though how feasible the link between wealth and democracy might seem to be, there are 
exceptions which raises doubts about whether or not a pure causal relationship or even strong 
correlation can be established. There have been concerns about the direction of this causal 
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relationship, which shall be addressed in a later section of the texts when discussing the 
choice of democracy as a control variable.  
When looking at the empirical evidence it is however clear that most states that do 
possess a high level of wealth do have a remarkable degree of strong democratic governance. 
The literature suggest that wealth of states promotes strong democratic institutions on the 
state-level. While it is noted that this theory is confined to the realm of the state  the logic of 
wealth leading to democratic governance could also be applicable to IPOs. As Lipset has 
noted, economic development in general entails a strengthening of the middle classes and 
more access to schooling. This could give rise to a higher desire of the public to be involved 
in politics including a call for involvement on the international level. In addition to this, if a 
state becomes more democratic the desire to be part of an international parliament could also 
rise. Therefore I have developed two hypotheses, which shall be tested in this thesis.   
1. The higher the average wealth of member states the stronger the IPO. 
2. The higher the average level of democracy of member states the stronger the IPO. 
 
Methods 
This research consists of a qualitative and a quantitative part, where the quantitative part shall 
consist of a statistical analysis and the qualitative part of a set of case studies. The statistical 
analysis shall first be deployed to map the variation in the dependent variable and test the 
hypotheses after which the case studies shall be conducted. A small N analysis, like limited 
case studies, can provide explanations for outliers and specific cases  and test the plausibility 
of relationships between variables (Lieberman 2005: 435). In this regard, a small N analysis 
can provide an additional dimension to the mere statistical testing of the strength of a model 
and the hypotheses and so enhance its analytical quality. Due to this complementary aspect 
this analysis shall be added. This research strategy of combining both methods is called a 
‘nested analysis’ and aims to improve the quality of measurement and confidence in the 
results of the study (Lieberman 2005: 436).  
The nested analysis begins with the statistical analysis which will narrow the range of 
possible explanations and guide the selection of cases for the small N- analysis. This guidance 
is central to the concept of a nested analysis in that each step of the analysis provides 
direction in approaching the next step (Lieberman 2005: 436).  The specific cases that are 
selected are dependent on whether it is necessary to follow a model testing or a model 
building approach. This will be determined following the results of the statistical analysis. If 
the statistical analysis finds a strong relationship the small N analysis leans towards theory 
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testing, whereas a weak relationship between the tested variables would suggest a theory 
building approach. The following part of the text will provide the operationalization necessary 
to conduct a statistical analysis.   
For the measurement of IPO strength Cofelice & Stavridus (2014) have designed 0-5 
Guttman ordinal scales that provide the possibility to rank the consultative, oversight, 
appointments, budgetary and legislative functions of each IPO according to the extent of their 
powers in each area. The 23 IPOs were ranked on these scales based on information of the 
functions of the parliaments found treaties and rules of procedure. 
The scores of the IPOs on these 0-5 scales were  coded into a parliamentary strength variable, 
the PPI or Parliamentary Power Index, using the formula below. 
 
𝑃𝑃 =
𝑎𝐶 +  𝛽𝑂 +  𝛾𝐴 +  𝛿𝐵 + 𝜀𝐿
5(𝑎 +  𝛽 +  𝛾 +  𝛿 +  𝜀)
          where        0 ≤   C ≤ 5 weight α = 0.5  
                                                                                              0 ≤   O ≤ 5 weight β = 1    
                                                                                              0 ≤   A ≤ 5 weight γ = 1  
                                                                                              0 ≤   B ≤ 5 weight δ = 1  
                                                                                              0 ≤   L ≤ 5 weight ε = 1 
                                            
In this formula C stands for Consultative, O for Oversight, A for Appointments, B for 
budgetary and L for legislative. Each function has been given the weight of 1 except for the 
consultative function because this does not, contrary to the others, entail a binding power 
towards the main intergovernmental body at the highest value (Cofelice & Stavridus 2014: 
157). I have, alongside my fellow students Sietse Paperborg, Armin Ademovic and Eef Van 
Der Werk, updated the scores provided by Cofelice & Stavridus, using these scales and this 
formula. Changes were found to the Cofelice & Stavridus scores for the Nordic council, the 
parliament of the ECOWAS and the Pan-African Parliament. In gathering the information 
treaties and rules of procedures were used. In cases where information was scarce academic 
articles were used in order to determine scores. The scores for each IPO can be found in  
appendix III. 
To measure wealth, the figures of the Credit Suisse Research Institute are used. This 
institute, a part of the Credit Suisse bank, releases an annual report on global wealth alongside 
an extensive dataset. This report aims to provide the best global estimates of the wealth 
holdings of households (Credit Suisse Databook 2015: 3). These estimates are based on  
household surveys and regression analyses using variables that are likely correlated 
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depending on the country and availability of data. Components of those     
wealth variables include house price growth, market capitalization for financial assets and 
GDP per capita debt growth (Credit Suisse Databook 2015: 7). When there are no direct data 
sources available econometric techniques are used to make projections of wealth. Whether the 
Credit Suisse institute comes with the ‘best global estimates’ may be disputed, but due to the 
careful attention it gives to the measurements and clear methodology presented in an 
extensive databook it can be regarded reliable source . As one would expect is the strength of 
the data for the countries that are included in the analysis not equal due to availability. For 
each country the dataset provides an indication of the quality of the data. Next to its clear 
methodology the choice to use this particular data also stems from practical reasons. The 
dataset includes a large amount of recent and available data including the  figures for GDP, 
Wealth per adult and total wealth for most countries. For the exact and extensive 
methodology used, I would suggest the reader to have a look at the Credit Suisse data book. 
To offer an extensive coverage of wealth in the statistical analysis I have chosen to work with 
two household wealth variables; wealth per adult and total wealth.  
For the measurement of democracy the Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2014 
dataset shall be used. This 2014 dataset offers various variables that describe patterns of 
authority and regime changes in the period 1800 to 2014 for 167 countries. The variable that 
is relevant for our research is institutional democracy. This variable takes in account the 
presence of institutions through which a citizen can express itself about leaders and policies, 
the amount of constrains on the executive by institutions and the amount of civil liberties 
citizens possess. In this variable countries are coded on a scale from 0-10 depending on their  
‘competitiveness of political participation’ ‘competitiveness of executive recruitment’ and 
‘constrains on the chief executive’ (Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual v2013: 14). The 
exact coding and weights of the sub variables can be found in appendix I. 
 The usage of the wealth and institutional democracy variables result in an unavoidable 
post-treatment bias. This bias occurs when the direction of the relationship between both 
variables is ambiguous, making it possible for the resulting biases to go either way (king 
2010). The degree of Institutional democracy could be both a consequence and a cause of 
level of wealth. Because of a likely correlation between democracy and wealth, democracy 
needs to be included in the statistical analysis as a control variable.  Leaving out a variable 
which could be highly correlated would give a biased estimation of the causal relationship 
studied (Bakija 2013: 4). When measuring the effect of wealth on IPO strength this ‘post-
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treatment’ bias is unavoidable and should therefore be taken account when assessing the 
findings of this study. 
 
Table 1: IPOs included in statistical analysis 
The cases that will be included in the statistical analysis are the 20 IPOs presented in table I. 
In parenthesis are the names that will show in the statistical analysis. It is not possible to 
conduct an analysis using all 22 IPOs due to data limitations. Not all countries have wealth 
scores and democracy scores available which, if this is the case for various countries in a 
certain IPO, leads me to exclude those IPOs from analyses. I have excluded the Central 
Arab Parliament (ARAB) 
The Benelux Inter-parliamentary Consultative Council (Benelux) 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Central European Initiative (CEIPA) 
Community Parliament of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
(CEMACPA) 
Inter parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) 
Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) 
East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) 
Economic Community of West African States Parliament (ECOWASPA) 
The European Free Trade Association Parliamentary Committee (EFTAPA) 
The European Parliament (EP) 
The Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union (MAGHREB) 
The Nordic Council (Nordic) 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty 
(OCST) 
Parliamentary Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCEPA) 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC) 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
Pan-African Parliament (PAP) 
The Andean Parliament (PARLANDINO) 
Mercosur Parliament (PARLASUR) 
Inter-parliamentary Committee of the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(UEMOAPA) 
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American Parliament (PARLACEN) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) due to significant gaps in data. For PARLACEN It is not possible 
to find scores for Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, 3 of the 6 members. For 
CARICOM it is not possible to find data for most of its 15 Caribbean member states due to 
their small scale. In these cases the gap in data is too large and could possibly scrutinize the 
validity of the findings.  Most other IPOs have missing data from 1 or multiple member states, 
but their size and relative scope to the country group as a whole have allowed me to still 
proceed the analyses. The list of the IPO that have missing data for one or more member 
states is included in the appendix II.  
In the next section the statistical analysis shall be conducted. First, the descriptive statistics of 
the four variables are presented in order to get a feel of the results of the used variables. The 
highly skewed distribution of values of both wealth variables make it necessary for those 
variables to be included as logarithms to control for this skew and keep a linear model. In the 
following analyses the wealth variables are thus included as logarithms.  After the descriptive 
analysis scatterplots are presented to give an impression of how the various IPOs score on the 
two wealth variables and the democracy variable. After this linear regression analysis shall be 
conducted to allow for testing of the effect of wealth on IPO strength.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
In the table 2 the general descriptives of the four variables are presented. Looking at 
the descriptives of the IPO Strength variable it can be noted that, there is a wide spread of 
values for the 20 IPOs ranging from very low (0,067) to very high (,899). With an average- 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics. 
               N     Mean      SD        Min       Max     Units/Scale  
 
IPO strength                     20     ,280       ,231        ,067       , 899     scale 0-1, 1=     
                                                                                                                         strongest   
Average adult wealth         20     4,337    ,760        2,960       5,620   logarithmic scale 
  
Total wealth         20     12,438   ,888       10,900    14,230  logarithmic scale 
 
Institutional democracy        20     6,336      2,767    1,941     10,000  scale 0-10, 10=                                                                                
                                                                                                                      most democratic 
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score of .29074 it is can be stated that IPOs in general appear score low in terms of Strength. 
The Scores for democracy are also widespread, from a average democracy score of (1.941) to 
IPOs with the highest possible value (10). This large range also applies for the wealth 
variables where the standard deviation is high. 
  The spread of values calls for a graphic representation to enhance the understanding of 
the data. The scatterplot, presented in figure 1.1, shows the spread of values of the 20 IPOs 
for the relation between average wealth per adult and IPO strength. It shows a wide spread of 
the IPOs which shows, on first sight, that there is not much of a correlation between average 
wealth per adult of the participating countries and the IPO strength. There are IPOs, which 
consist of countries with a relatively low wealth that are remarkably strong. This is visible in 
the top left part of the scatterplot with the African regional parliaments ECOWASPA, 
CEMACPA, UEMOAPA and the EALA. On the opposite side of the spectrum it is also clear 
that there are also IPOs consisting of ‘rich’ member states that have poor strength levels. This 
can be seen in the bottom right corner with the EFTAPA and BENELUX PA. It is striking 
that the bottom left corner is completely empty. countries that score lowest in terms of wealth 
do not have weak IPO representation. It seems to be that weak levels of strength are generally 
the case for the IPOs consisting of countries that score in the middle in terms of wealth. Very 
few of those IPOs exceed the average IPO strength score.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Scatterplot of the relation between IPO strength and average adult wealth 
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Figure 1.2: Scatterplot of the relation between IPO strength and total wealth 
 
 
In the scatterplot with the logarithm of the total wealth of participating states of an IPO we 
see a lot of similarities with the other variable. The African regional parliaments stay in the 
top left corner and there are still collectives of rich countries with poor IPO strength. The 
regression line shows little correlation between the variables. The almost horizontal 
regression lines in both scatterplot shows that not much of the variance in the dependent 
variable IPO strength is explained by the two independent wealth variables. A closer look at 
the data through linear regression analysis can test whether this is really the case.   
 
Table 2.1 : Linear regression model of the average adult wealth of IPO member states   
                                                                    Model 1. 
(Constant)                                                    0.600 
                                                                    (0.348) 
Wealth adult                                                -0.126  
                                                                    (0.106) 
Institutional Democracy                              0,036 
                                                                    (0,029) 
 
R                                                                  0.299 
R
2
                                                                                                 0.089 
Adj. R
2                                                                                      
- 0.018 
N                                                                  20 
 
Note: OLS-Regression analysis with standard errors in parentheses  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05 
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The R square shows that the strength of the association which is with 0,000 almost not 
existent. This is furthermore explained by the significance of .963 which is way higher than 
the p < 0,05 that is required to speak of significance. Table 2.2 shows the same tendencies. 
Here the R square is also low and the scores under significance (, 906) are similar to that of 
the other wealth variable (, 963). With this we can state that both variables of wealth do not 
adequately explain the variance in the strength of IPOs. The inclusion of the institutional 
democracy variable does furthermore not lead to a significant model. Therefore, both 
hypotheses are rejected.  
 
Table 2.2: Linear regression model of Total wealth IPO states 
                                                                    Model 3. 
(Constant)                                                    0.517 
                                                                    (0.918) 
Wealth adult                                                -0.027  
                                                                    (0.082) 
Institutional democracy                              0.015 
                                                                   (0.026) 
 
R                                                                  0.014 
R
2
                                                                                                 0.000 
Adj. R
2                                                                              
- 0.055 
N                                                                  20 
 
Note: OLS-Regression analysis with standard errors in parentheses  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05 
 
 
 
Small N- Case studies 
When theory is rejected by Large N- analysis, further analysis using a nested approach 
must be directed towards model-building instead of model-testing (Lieberman 2005) In this 
so-called ‘model-building Small N-Analysis’ (Mb-SNA) various case sources are used to 
develop theoretical accounts on the variation of the outcomes of the study. This model 
building analysis is directed towards finding the factors that explain why relatively poor states 
can have strong IPOs and relatively wealthy states can have weak IPOs, which is remarkable 
regarding the theory of wealth and democracy relationship. The scatterplots show that while 
most IPOs appear to be of relatively weak strength some cases stand out in the scatterplots.  
These cases contradict the general tendencies in the findings in terms of their respective 
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strength levels and therefore require explanation. The four African parliaments ECOWASPA 
, CEMACPA, UEMOAPA and EALA score,  with strength values of respectively .667, .578, 
.378 and .333,  considerably higher than the average IPO strength of .291. Due to time and 
space constrains those four cases shall not all be examined in-depth. The ECOWASPA is 
selected for case study because it, as the setting out of the particularities of this case in the 
next part shows, can be treated as an example of a certain trend that applies to these three 
other African IPOs. These explanatory factors of the strength of the ECOWASPA are applied 
to the CEMACPA, EALA and UEMOA to investigate whether these factors can explain the 
relative strength of these IPOs. 
To explain the strength values on the other end of the spectrum, the Benelux PA and 
the EFTA PA are selected. The Benelux PA and EFTA PA score respectively a .089 and .067 
which is remarkably lower than average. The case selection is thus based on an outlier 
approach, selecting cases that have not been predicted well by the statistical model. The case 
study starts by providing general information about the history and goals of the organisation 
and a look at the set of powers the specific IPO possesses. After this general description, a 
possible explanation that arises shall be examined. 
 
  The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 
and consists of group of 15 west African countries. It aims to contribute to the development of 
the African continent through the creation of an economic union to promote co-operation and 
integration among its member states (ECOWAS 1993: art. 3). It’s structure consists of the 
ECOWAS Commission,  the Community Court of Justice, the ECOWAS Bank for 
Investment and Development, various specialized agencies and the Community Parliament. 
This Community Parliament was formally established in 1993 with the signing of the revised 
ECOWAS treaty (art. 13).  At that time it became clear that those type of organisations 
required a certain political understanding, a certain transparency and accountability 
(Karuuombe 2008: 3). The first legislature of the parliament was inaugurated in 2000 and 
during its term of 5 years possessed only a limited consultative power where other 
Community institutions could decide for themselves whether or not to follow the 
recommendations provided by the parliament (Boré & Hekel 2015: 2). It took the parliament 
until end 2014, while being in its third legislature, to obtain additional powers through the so-
called Supplementary Act. This act provided the parliament with appointment, oversight, 
budgetary and legislative functions. It now has a binding consultative role in certain areas 
including the appointment of employees of some of the organisations of the community, 
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oversight and co-decision rights in matters of economic policy including the budget and an 
ability to  make legislation in cooperation with the council of ministers (Boré & Hekel 2015: 
4-5). The Guttman scale measurements conducted affirm this and show that the ECOWAS 
Parliament as of now possesses a wide range of powers, scoring a 4 for consultative, 2 for 
oversight, 3 for appointment, 4 for budgetary and a 4 for legislative.  
In factors that could explain why this specific parliament now scores among the 
highest IPOs the determination of the state leaders to enhance the powers of the ECOWAS 
Parliament stands out. In 2005, the leaders of the 15 member countries expressed hope in an 
parliament with a broader set of powers and demanded proposals from the Parliament and the 
ECOWAS Commission on how this greater set of powers could be achieved and structured 
(Boré & Hekel 2015: 2). Following this, the second and later the third legislature set up the 
the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Enhancement of Powers of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) to work on this proposal leading to the draft Supplementary Act, 
which was  approved by the state leaders end 2014 (Boré & Hekel 2015: 2). This determinacy 
to increase the parliamentary powers can be explained by the ECOWAS vision. This vision is  
‘’to create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance 
and where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous recourses through the 
creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation’’ 
(ECOWAS 2010). This vision for the period 2010-2020 aims to guide the ECOWAS towards 
a self-proclaimed ‘democratic and prosperous community’. These notion of democracy and 
principles of good governance in its vision, explain the ECOWAS efforts to enhance the 
powers of its parliament. Internationally, having a democratic integration process with a 
parliament that has legislative and oversight powers is regarded as a best practice (ECOWAS 
Business Law Handbook 2015: 292). The efforts of enhancing parliamentary powers are 
therefore conform its vision.  
The particular focus on good governance and democracy that guide efforts to increase 
the strength of its parliament can also be seen in the African IPOs of CEMACPA, UEMOA 
and EALA.  The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) states in 
its vision report that it strives for an safe, more integrated economic union based on principles 
of good governance to promote human development (2009: 18).  The East African 
Community, the main body of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) states in its 
report that good governance and democracy are and must be principles that guide its conduct 
of regional policy making and lists good democratic governance to be of crucial importance to 
sustainable human development and the reduction of poverty (EAC 2015: 93). This is being 
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regarded a necessity for the development of the region. The African Economic and Monetary 
Union (UEMOA) consists of the members of the ECOWAS that use the West African Franc. 
All of the ECOWAS members expressed the need for more parliamentary powers. In this 
regard, the notion of good governance also applies to the UEMOA member countries. While 
the exact definition of good governance may differ between the organisations, the concept 
here contains elements of institutional improvement while paying attention to democratic 
principles. It can be stated that those four  parliaments are all on a mission to develop their 
region through a particular focus on practices of good governance.   
The Benelux Economic Union is a regional group of three countries, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, founded in 1958. Its aims are to coordinate the financial, 
economic and social policy in an economic union to conduct a common policy in the 
economic affairs with other countries (Benelux 1958, art. 1). The previously, in 1955, set up 
Interparliamentary Consultative Council is the parliamentary body of the organisation. While 
being a consultative council it does possess the power to make non-binding recommendations 
about the budget, which is classified as a budgetary function under the Cofelice & Stravidus 
conceptualisation. The tasks of the council is to make recommendations to the governments of 
the member states on the issues of regional cooperation (Beneluxparliament n.d.). It was, as 
the name suggests, specifically set up with the intention of it being a consultative council. The 
revision of the treaty, which enhanced the Benelux cooperation to issues of justice and 
internal affairs and issues of integration outside of the EU domain, did not include for an 
enhanced set of powers for the Benelux parliament. Therefore this remains a mere 
consultative IPO. The fact that the BENELUX PA is a weak institution in terms of powers 
and continues to be so can be related back to its intention. It was not imagined to be a 
parliament with a broad scope of powers, like the four African IPOs discussed above. In 
addition to this it can specifically be noted that the Benelux Economic Union lacks a clear 
mission due to the parallel European Integration processes and the wide range of policies it 
deals with (Rood 2010: 189). The European Integration processes go beyond the original aims 
of the organisation and the new tasks the organisation acquired after the 2008 revision fall 
part to a lack of coherence between the various policy domains.   
This consultative intention and limited mission can also be found in the EFTAPA, The 
parliament committee of the European Free Trade Association consisting of Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It is a forum where the relations of the EFTA 
countries with the European Union and external trade relations are being discussed and 
upheld for democratic review (EFTA 2014).  It was set up in 1977 to act as a consultative 
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actor between the members of the national parliaments of the member states and the 
Association (Schiavone 2008 : 124). It was intended in its institutional framework to be a 
parliamentary body of discussion, of consultation rather than a parliament possessing a wide 
range of oversight, appointments, budgetary and legislative functions. It aims to promote the 
economic relations between the EFTA countries, to liberalize trade and the free movement of 
persons and to protect intellectual property rights (EFTA 2013 art. 2). This is substantially 
different from the four African IPOs that, as their visions suggest, aim to achieve broader 
integration.  
The differences that could explain the relative strengths of the examined four African 
parliaments contrary to the relative weakness of the BENELUX PA and EFTAPA can be 
listed as differences in intention and mission. The African cases all have a desire to develop 
their regions to eradicate poverty, persuit economic development and strive for sustainable 
development. Good governance, of which having an IPO with a broad set of powers is a good 
example, is seen as fundamental to achieving this goal. The BENELUX PA and EFTAPA, do 
not have the intention to set up community parliaments with a wide set of powers but intended 
these IPOs as forums of democratic consultation. Its mission is less ambitious in the goals of 
regional integration. Therefore the examined four African IPOs are relatively strong and the 
BENELUX PA and EFTAPA relatively weak.  
Intention and mission as determinants for the strength of an IPO could be applied to 
explain the positions of other cases, for example the European Union. The European 
Parliament began as the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, a 
parliamentary institution possessing only consultative powers (CVCE 2014: 3). The European 
Parliament is now the strongest IPO scoring a .889 on the Cofelice & Stravridus scale. This 
change in powers can be explained by the enlarged scope of its mission of European 
integration because parliamentary powers increased as European Integration continued 
forward (CVCE 2014: 4). This shows that while the peoples representation in the union was 
originally not thought of as to be of a parliament with a wide scope of powers, the 
enlargement of its mission in european integration shaped a stronger parliament. 
The mission of the organisation  and the intention in what form to set up parliamentary 
bodies can therefore be regarded as a plausible explanation to  explaining why certain IPOs 
possess more powers then others. The case studies show that the highest scoring IPOs all have 
a mission that encompasses broad integration in the region on numerous policy fields and 
regard having a parliament with a broad set of powers as important for their organisation. 
Low scoring IPOs such as the BENELUX PA and EFTA PA have a different intention with 
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the IPOs created and  strive in their mission for regional integration that is less extensive. This 
theory here thus presented sets out the plausible idea that the extent of intention and mission 
explain the positions of the IPO on the strength scale. While this applies to a wide set of 
cases, it does require further analysis to determine the extent of the influence of these factors.  
  
Conclusion 
This research followed the trend in political sciences of studying institutional strength by 
looking at a relatively unknown International Parliamentary Organs. These IPOs that are 
important actors of study due to their ability to mitigate the democratic deficit in 
supranational governance show a remarkable difference of strength. IPO strength values 
ranged from 0,067 to 0,889 on the PPI 0-1 scale. Investigated is whether wealth of member 
states could account for this gap.  Lipset (1959) and  others including Przeworski, (2000) and 
Norris (2007) have investigated the effects of wealth on state democracy. The statistical 
analysis shows that the relationship between a wealth and democracy does not hold for the 
realm of democracy that is confined outside of the state. Therefore the hypotheses ‘The higher 
the average wealth of member states the stronger the IPO’ and ‘the higher the average level of 
democracy of member states the stronger the IPO’ are rejected. Although wealth of the 
member states is not significant, a pursuit of economic development/wealth could drive  a 
broad mission of regional integration as the examined four African parliaments show.  The 
Small N-analysis finds that the strength of an IPO can, at least partly be explained by the 
intention of the parliament and the scope mission of the organization.  The case studies shows 
that these factors provide a plausible explanation for the difference in strength levels for the 
investigated cases and these could possibly be generalized outside of these cases to other 
IPOs. Therefore these factors should be taken serious in further studies to the determinants of 
IPO strength. This model needs further testing to determine the extent of the influence of 
these factors and the possibility of generalizing to all cases. The large spread of values that 
confirm the findings of Cofelice & Stravridus (2014), need further attention in order to fully 
grasp the presence of IPOs on the world stage.  
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Appendix I: Institutional democracy coding  
‘The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator 
of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the 
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive 
using the following weights’: 
 
 Authority Coding          Scale/weight 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP) 
(3) Election          +2  
(2) Transitional         +1 
 
 Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN) 
Only if XRCOMP is Election (3) or Transitional (2) 
(3) Dual/election         +1  
(4) Election          +1 
 
Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST): 
 (7) Executive parity or subordination      +4 
 (6) Intermediate category        +3  
(5) Substantial limitations        +2  
(4) Intermediate category        +1  
 
Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP):   
(5) Competitive         +3  
(4) Transitional        +2  
(3) Factional          +1 
 
Source: Polity IV project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013: 
Dataset users’ manual, pg. 14-15 
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Appendix II: States excluded from analysis 
This is a list of the states in certain IPOs for which it was not possible to collect the necessary 
data and hence are excluded from research. 
  
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE): Andorra, Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino  
 
The European Parliament (EP): Malta 
 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Central European Initiative (CEIPA): Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
 
The Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union (MAGHREB): Libya 
 
 Pan-African Parliament   (PAP): Central African Republic, Libya, Saharawi Democratic 
Republic, Somalia 
 
Community Parliament of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
(CEMACPA): Central African Republic, Sao Tome 
 
Arab Parliament (ARAB): Palestine, Somalia, Iraq, Yemen, Libya 
 
Parliamentary Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCEPA): Andorra, 
Bosnia Herzegovina, The Holy See (Vatican city), Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, 
Uzbekistan 
 
Inter parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS): Uzbekistan 
 
Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP): Sao tome, Timor-Leste 
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Apendix III. IPO strength Scores and IPO strength conceptualization  
 
IPO CONS. OVERSIGHT APP. BUDGET LEG PPI 
ARAB 3 2 0 1 0 .200 
ACCP / / / / / / 
BENELUX 2 0 0 1 0 .089 
CEIPA 3 0 0 0 0 .067 
CEMACPA 4 4 0 4 3 .578 
CIS 3 0 0 0 0 .067 
CPLP 3 2 0 0 0 .156 
EALA 3 3 0 1 2 .333 
ECOWASPA 4 2 3 4 4 .667 
EFTA 3 0 0 0 0 .067 
EP 4 5 4 5 4 .889 
EURASEC / / / / / / 
MAGHREB 3 0 0 0 0 .067 
NORDIC 4 3 0 1 2 .356 
OCST 3 0 0 0 0 .067 
OSCEPA 3 2 0 1 0 .200 
PABSEC 3 0 0 0 0 .067 
PACE 4 3 2 1 2 .444 
PAP 3 2 0 1 2 .289 
PARLACEN / / / / / .333 
PARLANDINO 3 2 0 1 1 .244 
PARLASUR 4 3 0 1 2 .356 
UEMOAPA 3 2 2 1 2 .378 
 
These scores are based on the ranking on cofelice & stavridus 0-5 gutmann scales that 
are presented on the next pages 
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